

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 009364

13

ORIGIN EUR-06

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 SS-10 /023 R

66611

DRAFTED BY: EUR/P: MJERABEK:SS

APPROVED BY: EUR/P: FSEIDNER

EAJ-MR. PIEZ

C-MR. SHINN

EUR/SOV-MR. COLBERT

S/S-O: L. MATTESON

----- 062846

R 162308Z JAN 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS STATE 009364

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 009364 ACTION MOSCOW 15 JANUARY.

QUOTE

UNCLAS STATE 009364

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: UR, ECON

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S JANUARY 14 PRESS CONFERENCE: Q AND

A'S.

REF: STATE 9262

BEGIN QUOTE: AND NOW I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, GOING TO YOUR LAST REMARKS, ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT CONGRESS IS AT FAULT IN GREAT PART FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED, AND IF THAT IS WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING, WHY DID YOU AND CONGRESS EQUALLY ENGAGE IN THIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WHICH SEEM TO TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THOSE ASSURANCES HAD BEEN RECEIVED?

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 009364

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK THAT ALL OF YOU CAN REVIEW THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT I HAVE MADE OVER THE YEARS OF THIS DEBATE EXPRESSING OUR JUDGMENT AS TO THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THIS COURSE.

YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT IN MY TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 3, I STATED EXPLICITLY THAT IF ANY CLAIM WERE MADE THAT THIS WAS A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSACTION, AND IF ANY ASSERTIONS WERE MADE THAT ASSURANCES HAD BEEN EXTENDED, THAT THOSE WOULD BE REPUDIATED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF REASONS THAT LED TO THE SOVIET DECISION. THE PURPOSE OF MY REMARKS WAS NOT TO PUT THE BLAME ANYWHERE, BUT IN ORDER TO PUT THE DEBATE BEHIND US AND TO TURN US TOWARDS THE FUTURE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT ARE SOME OF THOSE REASONS DO YOU THINK THAT LED THE SOVIETS TO THIS MOVE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I BELIEVE, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED PUBLICLY, THAT SINCE THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS THERE HAVE

BEEN MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT WERE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT. AND THE DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE EX-IM BANK CEILING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN LEADING TO THIS TURN OF EVENTS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU THINK THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF EMIGRATION OF PEOPLE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY JEWS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION.

Q: DO YOU THINK THE NUMBER WILL GO DOWN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WOULD NOT WANT TO SPECULATE. THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CLEAR BEFORE THAT WE FAVORED THE WIDEST POSSIBLE EMIGRATION, AND WE DID SO PRIVATELY. AND, FOR A TIME, NOT INEFFECTIVELY.  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 009364

Q: MR. SECRETARY, RIGHT NOW, DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS OR WILL BEGIN TO APPLY INTENSIVE PRESSURE IN ANY PARTICULAR REGION OF THE WORLD?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE SO. I SIMPLY STATED THIS TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF THIS SHOULD HAPPEN. I ALSO WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PURSUE A POLICY OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS THAT THE POLITICAL PREMISES OF OUR POLICY OF DETENTE REMAIN IN FULL FORCE, AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS TO SEE HOW THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TRADE BILL CAN BE APPLIED TO THE SOVIET UNION UNDER CONDITIONS THAT ARE PERHAPS MORE ACCEPTABLE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU CARE TO CHARACTERIZE THE SOVIET LETTER OF REJECTION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK IT WAS FACTUAL.

Q: WHEN WAS IT RECEIVED, SIR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT WAS RECEIVED ON FRIDAY, AND THE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECT TO IT WERE CONCLUDED YESTERDAY.

Q: DO YOU THINK THIS REFLECTS ANY CHANGE WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP? DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS A CHANGE OF WHICH THIS IS ONE RESULT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER TO THAT EFFECT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, AFTER THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING VOICES WERE RAISED IN CONGRESS SAYING THAT SINCE IT HAS BEEN PROVED POSSIBLE TO BE TOUGH WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE TRADE BILL, THAT WE SHOULD THEREFORE GO BACK AND RENEGOTIATE THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, AND GET LOWER CEILINGS WITH THEM. DO YOU THINK THAT SORT OF PUBLIC STATEMENT HAD ANY IMPACT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 009364

DIVIDUAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS. I TRIED TO POINT OUT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE LIMITS OF WHAT A SUPER-POWER CAN

ACCEPT. AND YOU MAY REMEMBER THAT I WARNED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT THE IMPACT ON DETENTE OF SUCH A DEBATE WITH RESPECT TO VLADIVOSTOK.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU EXPECT NOW THAT THE VISIT OF MR. BREZHNEV TO THIS COUNTRY MIGHT BE PUT INTO QUESTION?"

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THIS. ALL THE COMMUNICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION IS UNCHANGED. AND WE WILL CONDUCT OUR POLICY UNTIL WE RECEIVE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY ON THE BASIS OF CARRYING FORWARD THE POLICY OF DETENTE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, THE LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT, AS I RECALL IT, SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT HAVE TO MAKE ANY FURTHER PAYMENTS AFTER THIS YEAR IF IT DID NOT RECEIVE MOST-FAVORED-NATION. SO CAN WE ASSUME THAT THAT MEANS THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALSO NOT BE PAYING ANY FURTHER LEND-LEASE PAYMENTS. AND THAT IN TURN RAISES THE QUESTION OF

SHOULD THEY STILL BE ENTITLED TO ANY CREDITS AT ALL?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, WITH RESPECT TO THE LEND-LEASE, WE HAVE NOT SORTED OUT SPECIFICALLY FROM WHAT OBLIGATIONS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE RELIEVED. BUT I THINK YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS A REASONABLE ONE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE GRANTING OF NEW CREDITS HAS BEEN LINKED

TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MFN, AND THEREFORE YOUR SECOND QUESTION IS REALLY MOOT, BECAUSE NO NEW CREDITS CAN BE EXTENDED UNDER THE EXISTING LEGISLATION.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION FIRST COMMUNICATE WITH YOU THAT THEY INTENDED TO DO THIS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE TRADE ACT AND THE EX-IM LEGISLATION, THE SOVIET UNION MADE CLEAR UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 009364

IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING PUBLIC COMMENTS, ITS DISPLEASURE WITH THE LEGISLATION. BUT IT DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH US FORMALLY. AFTER THE TRADE ACT WAS SIGNED, WE INFORMED THE SOVIET UNION OF THE PRECISE STEPS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN UNDER THE TRADE ACT TO IMPLEMENT THE TRADE AGREEMENT AND TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE WAIVER PROVISIONS OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. IN RESPONSE TO THESE PROVISIONS, WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO APPLY THE WAIVER WITHOUT SOME SOVIET ACTION, THE SOVIET UNION INFORMED US THAT THEY WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THESE ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS SPECIFICALLY WERE THAT THE TRADE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE AMENDED TO RUN NOT FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS, BUT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FACT THAT IT MIGHT LAPSE AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS IN CASE MFN WERE NOT EXTENDED. AND WE HAD TO HAVE ASSURANCES THAT WE COULD MAKE STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET EMIGRATION PRACTICES, OR RATHER ASSURANCES THAT WE HAD BEEN GIVEN WITH RESPECT TO EMIGRATION PRACTICES, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT REPUDIATE.

NOW, AS I HAVE POINTED OUT ON MANY OCCASIONS, THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED -- AND YOU MAY HAVE SEEN STORIES THAT WE HAD RESISTED THE WORD "ASSURANCE" THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONGRESS -- THAT THE INFORMATION WE HAD RECEIVED CONCERNED THE APPLICATION OF SOVIET LAW AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET PRACTICES. AND AS I HAD MADE CLEAR ON DECEMBER 3, ANY ASSURANCES CONCERNING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE BOUND TO BE REJECTED, AND THEY HAVE BEEN.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT MANY OFFICIALS IN THIS GOVERNMENT HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET

UNION IS NOT GETTING ENOUGH OUT OF DETENTE, AND ONE OF ITS MAIN PURPOSES IN HAVING A DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS IN IMPROVING ITS TRADE, GETTING TECHNOLOGY, GETTING CREDITS FROM THE UNITED STATES, CAN YOU TELL US TN WHAT YOU BASE YOUR OPTIMISM THAT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF DETENTE CAN CONTINUE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I STATED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS THAT WE HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED HAVE INDICATED THAT THE UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 009364

SOVIET UNION WISHES THIS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP TO CONTINUE. WE HAVE NO OTHER EVIDENCE. AND WE WILL, OF COURSE, BASE OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS ON THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND NOT ON THE NOTE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, EVIDENTLY PUBLICITY AND CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE HAD A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH THE SOVIET DECISION. DOES THIS RAISE THE QUESTION WHETHER A DEMOCRACY LIKE OURS CAN PURSUE OPENLY A DETENTE POLICY WITH THE STVIET UNION, OR MUST IT BE PURSUED IN SECRET AND RISK FAILURE IF THE PUBLIC BROUGHT INTO IT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I REALLY DO NOT THINK ANY USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY SPECULATING ON ALL THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

I BELIEVE THAT ANY FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THAT IS NOT BASED ON PUBLIC SUPPORT AND ABOVE ALL ON CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT WILL NOT HAVE A FIRM FOUNDATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THIS CONTROL IS EXERCISED AND IN WHAT DETAIL. AND THIS IS A MATTER THAT WILL REQUIRE CONSTANT ADJUSTMENT AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS.

I REPEAT -- WE SHARED THE OBJECTIVE OF THOSE WITH WHOSE TACTICS WE DISAGREE, AND WE DO NOT THINK THAT THESE TACTICS WERE IN ANY SENSE IMPROPER OR UNREASONABLE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU SEE ANY LINK BETWEEN THE SOVIET ACTION THAT YOU ARE DISCUSSING AND RECENT REPORTS THAT MR. BREZHNEV HAS BEEN UNDER CRITICISM AT HTME FOR HIS DETENTE APPROACH?

SECTETARY KISSINGER: WELL, ALL I KNOW ABOUT THOSE STORIES IS WHAT I READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS. AND WE HAVE TO BASE OUR POLICIES ON THE ACTIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. AND THEREFORE, I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ON THE INTERNAL POSITION OF VARIOUS SOVIET LEADERS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 009364

THEIR PURCHASES OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS TO FURTHER GIVE EVIDENCE OF THIS DISPLEASURE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE NOT STATED THAT THERE IS SOVIET DISPLEASURE WITH THE UNITED STATES. I STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION OBJECTED TO CERTAIN LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ABOUT WHAT

SOVIET COMMERCIAL PRACTICES WILL BE HENCEFORTH, AND IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE NOT MADE A DECISION.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE IT AS BEING ACCURATE TO SAY THAT DURING THE MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SENATORS, YOU HAD INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU COULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE SENATORS ON THESE SPECIFIC EMIGRATION ISSUES, BUT OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE SOVIET UNION HAS CHANGED ITS POLICY WHEREBY IT NO LONGER CAN STAND BY THE INFORMATION THAT IT HAD GIVEN TO YOU DURING THOSE MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE REASON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SENATORS TOOK SO LONG WAS OUR CONCERN TO MAKE SURE THAT WE WOULD COMMUNICATE NOTHING THAT WE COULD NOT BACK UP. THE SOVIET UNION GAVE US CERTAIN DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR DOMESTIC PRACTICES, WHICH WE ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE AS ACCURATELY AS WE COULD. OBVIOUSLY THOSE WHO WERE CONCERNED WITH PROMOTING EMIGRATION ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THESE DESCRIPTIONS AS PRECISE AND AS DETAILED AS POSSIBLE. AND THAT IS PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE.

I THINK WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED IS WHEN THE SOVIET UNION LOOKED AT THE TOTALITY OF WHAT IT HAD TO GAIN FROM THIS TRADING RELATIONSHIP AS AGAINST THE INTRUSIONS IN ITS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, IT DREW THE BALANCE SHEET OF WHICH WE HAVE THE RESULT TODAY. BUT THEY HAVE NEVER DISAVOWED THE ASSURANCES OR THE STATEMENTS IN MY LETTER.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAY THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THIS. HOWEVER, WAS NOT ONE OF THE INCENTIVES THAT WE USED IN RELATIONS UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 009364

WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE TRADE INCENTIVE, TO THAT EXTENT LINKAGE. AND TO THAT EXTENT IS THERE NOT SOME IMPLICATION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT WOULD BE MY JUDGMENT THAT THE INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE MUST BE EQUALLY SHARED BY BOTH SIDES. I HAVE STATED THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION IN MANY STATEMENTS BEFORE THE CONGRESS, IN WHICH

I POINTED OUT THAT IT IS OUR VIEW, AND IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH THE MAXIMUM DEGREE OF LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO CREATE THE GREATEST INCENTIVE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF STABLE RELATIONSHIPS.

WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE EXPLORING THESE POSSIBILITIES. AND WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THE CONGRESS WILL DEAL WITH US IN A CONCILIATORY AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. SO WE LOOK AT THIS AS AN INTERRUPTION, AND NOT AS A FINAL STEP.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAD SAID A EN E TRADE BILL PASSED THAT THEY COULD LIVE WITH IT. YOU WERE ASKED AT ONE POINT WHETHER YOU WOULD RECOM-

MEND VETOING OF THE EX-IM BANK LEGISLATION, AND YOU DIDN'T ANSWER IT DIRECTLY, AND THE PRESIDENT SIGNED IT. DID YOU

HAVE ANY IDEA THAT THIS WAS COMING? COULDN'T YOU HAVE TAKEN A STEP LIKE VETOING THE EX-IM BANK TO HAVE PREVENTED THIS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, WE ARE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WERE DIFERENCES OF VIEW AS TO WHAT THE TRAFFIC WOULD BEAR. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ANYBODY READING MY STATEMENTS OVER THE YEALS CAN HAVE ANY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT MY VIEW WAS AND MY STATEMENTS ARE ON THE PUBLIC RECORD. AND THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THIS.

FOR THE UNITED STATES TO VETO LEGISLATION WHICH MADE CREDITS AVAILABLE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS FOR TRADING WITH THE WHOLE WORLD -- BECAUSE OF AN UNSATISFACTORY LIMITA-  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 009364

TION WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION AT THE END OF A PROLONGED PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION -- WAS A DECISION WHICH THE PRESIDENT FELT HE COULD NOT TAKE, AND IT IS A DECISION WITH WHICH I AGREED. IT CAME DOWN TO A FINE JUDGMENT. IT WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED THE BASIC PROBLEM, ANYWAY, BECAUSE WITH THE EX-IM LEGISLATION VETOED, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE HAD NO REASON TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE TRADE PROVISIONS IN ANY EVENT. SO WE WERE FACED WITH A VERY DIFFICULT CHOICE. IN ONE CASE THEY WOULD GET DOLLARS 300 MILLION; IN THE OTHER CASE THEY COULD GET NOTHING.

Q: THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY. END QUOTE. KISSINGER UNQUOTE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 JAN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE009364  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** EUR/P:MJERABEK:SS  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750189/baaaagmy.tel  
**Line Count:** 378  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ORIGIN EUR  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** MorefiRH  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 15 JAN 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <15 JAN 2003 by daviscw>; APPROVED <25 Nov 2003 by MorefiRH>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** ECON, UR  
**To:** TOKYO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006